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Endel Tulving’s Challenge
Sonam Thakchoe
University of Tasmania
ABSTRACT
In my response to Ganeri’s [2018] paper, I take Buddhagosha’s deﬂationary account of
episodic memory one step further through the analysis of the Madhyamaka
philosopher Candrakırti (ca. 570-640) who, like Buddhagosha, explicitly defends
episodic memory as a recollection of the objects experienced in the past, rather than
subjective experience. However, unlike Buddhagosha, Candrakırti deﬂates episodic
memory by showing the incoherence of the Sautrantika-Yogacara’s thesis that
episodic memory requires the admission of reﬂexive awareness. Also unlike
Buddhagosha, Candrakırti shows the incoherence of the Mima _msaka-Naiyayika’s self-
implication requirement thesis, therefore directly countering Tulving’s challenge to
the Buddhist philosophers, by arguing that episodic memory is capable of mental time
travel without any reference to the operation of enduring self. I will thus suggest that
Candrakırti may have even greater success in deﬂating the self-implication
requirement of episodic memory.
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1. Endel Tulving’s Challenge
According to Endel Tulving, mental time travel is the reliving or re-experiencing, or a
relocating of oneself in subjective time by mentally travelling back into the past or into
the future. Since such time travelling necessarily implies a traveller without which there
can be no mental time travel, and that the traveller, Tulving claims, is none other than
the self; episodic memory is distinctive in satisfying the self-implication requirement since
it operates with the self [Tulving 2005: 14]. Thus, Tulving’s challenge to the Buddhist
philosophers, given their denial of the self, is clear: they cannot pull off advancing a
coherent account of episodic memory, and without that, the notion of mental time travel
also becomes incoherent for the Buddhist philosophers.
2. Ganeri’s Call to Respond
Jonardon Ganeri [2018], in his target essay, ‘Mental Time Travel and Attention’, has
rightly drawn our attention to the topic of episodic memory and has made a timely call
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upon Buddhist philosophers to give it the due consideration it deserves. In his paper,
Ganeri considers three Buddhist accounts of episodic memory: Buddhaghosa [c. 400 CE],
Vasubandhu [c. 316–396], and Dignaga [c. 480–540 CE]. Of the three accounts, Ganeri
concludes that Buddhagosha’s theory of memory may be the most promising Buddhist
alternative and that it could potentially counter Tulving’s challenge. According to Ganeri,
Buddhagosha’s chief argument is that episodic memory consists of a proprietary kind of
attention to objects from past perceptual encounters without making any explicit reference
to the subjective experience. Buddhagosha’s account, therefore, has greater success in
deﬂating the self-implication requirement in contrast to Vasubandhu’s and Dignaga’s
account which requires making an explicit reference to the subjectivity via reﬂexivity.
But there is at least one other Buddhist philosopher for whom this debate is familiar
philosophical terrain and whose analysis may better support the argument for the efﬁ-
cacy of deﬂated memory. In my commentary on Ganeri’s paper, I aim to bring to light
the analysis of the Madhyamaka philosopher Candrakırti [ca. 570-640] to take Buddha-
gosha’s deﬂationary account of episodic memory one step further. Like Buddhagosha,
Candrakırti explicitly defends a deﬂationary account of memory as consisting of cogni-
tive ability to recollect in the future the past objects or actions in virtue of proprietary
attention directed towards them without making any explicit reference to a reﬂexive
recollection of the past subjective experience.
But ﬁrst let us brieﬂy turn to Candrakırti’s critiques of the inﬂationary account of
memory: (1) the Sautrantika-Yogacara reﬂexive awareness-implicating memory thesis
and (2) the Mima _msaka-Naiyayika’s self-implicating memory thesis. Both these cri-
tiques have a direct bearing on countering Tulving’s challenge for Buddhist philosophy.
3. Critique of Reﬂexivity Implicating Memory Theory
First, the Sautrantika-Yogacara claims that memory includes both the recollection of
the object and the recollection of the subject seeing the object. Without reﬂexive cogni-
tion the recollection of the subjective experience is not possible. Therefore, reﬂexive
cognition must exist [Madhyamakavatarabhasỵa MABh VI.72, dBu ma ‘a 272a].
Candrakırti, however, regards the reﬂexivity implicating account of memory to be
incoherent, stating:
It is not proven that [a cognition] is aware of itself. Nor can this be proven by using the subse-
quent memory [of a previous cognition as evidence], for, in this case, the thesis intended to sub-
stantiate your claim itself entails an unproven premise, and therefore it cannot be admitted [as
valid proof] [MadhyamakavataraMA VI.73, trans. Huntington 1989: 166, modiﬁed].
For Candrakırti, the reﬂexivity thesis is incoherent. The ﬁrst chapter of
Mulamadhyamakakarika has shown that it is not possible to prove the existence of
reﬂexive cognition because the production of intrinsic memory, which the Sautrantika-
Yogacara appropriates as the proof, has been decisively shown to be impossible [MA
VI.8ab]. The argument goes like this:
1. We have reﬂexive cognition
2. Because we have an intrinsic episodic memory.
The argument fails to prove the existence of episodic memory because the premise itself
needs to be proven [MABh VI.73, dBu ma ‘a 272b-273a]. It is like this circular argument:
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1. Sound is impermanent
2. Because it is visually perceptible.
In this argument, the premise is unproven and thus it cannot be used as an evidence
for the conclusion. Likewise, the Sautrantika-Yogacara argument’s premise—intrinsic
episodic memory—remains unproven like its unproven conclusion—reﬂexive aware-
ness. It is therefore incoherent to appropriate memory to prove the existence of reﬂex-
ive cognition [MABh VI.73, dBu ma ‘a 273a].
Even if we grant that memory is conventionally real, still it cannot prove the exis-
tence of reﬂexive cognition because the reﬂexivity of cognition is not established in any
example that does not already presuppose what the Sautrantika-Yogacara is trying to
show: a sword does not cut itself; a ﬁnger-tip does not touch itself, etc. It is unreason-
able that cognition should reﬂexively apprehend itself because there is an implicit
inconsistency in the notion of introspective activity (svatmanivrṭti) [MABh VI.72-3,
dBu ma ‘a 271-3a].
4. Critique of the Self-Implicating Memory Theory
Second, Aryadeva formulates the self-implicating memory argument as follows:
1. Self is eternal
2. Because a recollection of other lives is possible [Catuh̣sataka, CSV X.6].
Candrakırti offers the reconstruction of Aryadeva’s formulation of his opponent’s self-
implicating memory argument this way:
The self is eternal because there is a memory of previous life. A memory of previous birth is not
feasible for causally conditioned entities of other lives whose nature is to disintegrate no sooner
than where they arise, and whatever arises subsequently invariably differ from its antecedent.
Therefore, it is not possible to have the recollection of one’s past lives, such as remembering: “I
had this type of life” or “I had that type of life in the past.” But because the self is eternal it can
travel across lives making the recollection of one’s past lives possible [Catuh̣satakatı̣ka CST ̣X.6,
dBu ma Ya 161b-1621a].
This account of self-implicating memory, as Ganeri [2018] has shown in his paper,
closely resembles Tulving’s notion of episodic memory, both of which insists on the
entailment of enduring self. Tulving [1985: 1] claims, autonoetic consciousness ‘medi-
ates an individual’s awareness of his or her existence and identity in subjective time
extending from the personal past through the present to the personal future’.
Against the self-implicating memory thesis, Aryadeva advances this reductio ad
absurdum argument:
If your self is eternal
Because of remembering life,
Why is your body not eternal
In virtue of the sight of scar formed in the previous life? [CSV X.7].
We can unpack this reductio into two separate arguments:
1. There is, in this life, a memory of the past life.
2. Therefore, the self must be eternal.
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We shall call this the self-implicating memory argument.
1. There is a sight of the birthmark in this life of the wound caused in the past life.
2. Therefore, the body must be eternal.
We shall call this the body-implicating sight argument.
The Madhyamika contention is that the Naiyayika-Mıma _msaka and, by implication,
Tulving should either accept both the arguments or reject both the arguments [CST ̣
X.7, dBu ma Ya 162a].
If it makes sense that the self, which while entirely causally produced, is reiﬁed to be eternal
entity just because there is a memory of the past lives, then the body too should be reiﬁed as
eternal. But if you assert the body is not eternal [mutatis mutandis], there is no such thing as
eternal self [CST ̣X.7, dBu ma Ya 162a].
According to Candrakırti, Tulving does not have any sound justiﬁcation to pre-
fer the self-implicating memory thesis over the body-implicating sight thesis, with-
out committing a self-contradiction. If a memory of the past subjective experience
is a proof of the eternity of the self, mutatis mutandis, in light of this logic Tulv-
ing will need to accept the sight of a birthmark in this life of the past wound as a
valid proof of the eternity of the body. If, however, Tulving wants to claim that a
sight of birthmark in this life does not prove the eternity of the body, then muta-
tis mutandis, he will need to accept that memory as well does not prove the eter-
nity of the self.
Therefore, Candrakırti concludes:
the arguments discussed above and will discuss below demonstrate [the self-implicating mem-
ory theory] is fallacious. Just as the memory of births arises, it is possible to produce the sight of
a birthmark in this life resembling the injury in the past. Therefore, it does not follow from the
fact of a memory of the births that there is an eternal self. Otherwise, it would follow the absurd
conclusion that the body is eternal [CST ̣X.7, dBu ma Ya 162ab].
5. Madhyamika Deﬂationism and Episodic Memory
Let us now turn to Candrakırti’s account of memory. For Candrakırti the continuum of a
person is a wholly conditioned phenomenon, exclusively existing as impermanent, deter-
mined by the particularities of their causes and conditions and upon which we designate
‘I’, ‘self’, as an appropriating agent. It is thus reasonable to say: ‘I remember my life’ with-
out making any explicit reﬂexive reference to an enduring self [CST ̣X.7, dBu ma Ya 162a].
On the other hand, [according to us] memory is no different from [a cognition involved in] the
experience of the object, and therefore one’s own memory occurs in the form “I saw [a particu-
lar object].” That is the position taken for granted in everyday experience [MA VI.75, trans.
Huntington 1989: 166]
All cognitive subjects arise dependently from their respective cognitive objects. Mem-
ory cognition follows the same convention: it arises from the object it remembers.
When we remember a blue object, we remember it by means of memory cognition—
the subject—that arises from the recollecting of the object, since the cognitive subject is
an integral part of the object memory-making process, there is, therefore, no need for a
separate memory of the subject. Hence memory of the subject arises together with a
memory of the object. Nonetheless, memory does not fully differentiate the perceptive
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perspective taken by the experiencing cognitive subject, so one just thinks, ‘I saw it.’
That again, says Candrakırit, is the procedure of the world, satisfying social convention
[MABh VI.74, dBu ma ‘a 273b].
In the Pa~ncaskandhaprakaranạ (PSP), Candrakırti says memory’s ability to recall
the events we have done, or were in the process of doing, arises from proprietary atten-
tion directed towards the object that we currently apprehend and that we recollect in
the future. When the application of proprietary attention to the object is not present;
memory cognition fails to remember [PSP dBu ma Ya 262a].
But there is no one particular past object that we could make to act as a reservoir of
memory. In other words, the object we remember is not exactly the same object we saw
earlier. There is no persistent object that could present itself twice: to a present cogni-
tion and a future memory cognition [CST ̣XI.9, dBu ma Ya 182b]. Elucidating the type
of object is at issue in memory, Aryadeva states:
Things that [are] seen do not reappear
Nor does that awareness arise again.
Memory is about cessation,
Its object invariably consists of what has been ceased [CST ̣XI.10, dBu ma Ya 182b].
The objects we visually apprehend now, that same object cannot reappear in the
future for another cognition. That is because both cognitive subjects and objects are
transient and empty of intrinsic nature, ontologically deﬂated, and dependent upon the
conditions from which they arise. Since they lack any intrinsic nature, subjects and
objects undergo change conditioned by the causes from which they arise. Thus, a blue
object of the past cannot reemerge in the same persistent mode as an object of the sub-
sequent memory consciousness, for it is not possible for an entity to remain the same
at any two different moments, given the law of universal impermanence. When the for-
mer blue object does not exactly reappear in the future to any cognition, it is not possi-
ble for any memory cognition to arise from that particular blue object which is not
there anymore—therefore, it is not possible for memory cognition to arise from that
same blue object we saw in the past.
The implication, then, is that the type of object to which memory cognition is
directed towards or engages with is the past object that has now ceased and now no lon-
ger exists. Hence Aryadeva says, ‘memory is about cessation, its object invariably con-
sists of what has been ceased’ [CST ̣XI.10, dBu ma Ya 182b]. Candrakırti’s commentary
gets to the heart of the argument at issue:
Does this imply that there is no memory that could recall the past subjective experience? Who
would claim, “there isn’t”? We do not deny the existence of a dependently originated [memory].
We accept the facticity of memory as it is as Acarya [Aryadeva] deﬁnes it: “Memory is about
cessation; its object invariably consists of what has been ceased.” Therefore, the perceptual
object of memory is invariably a bygone object.
If past things are intrinsically real, and that there is a memory that takes up that as its object,
that memory will also have to be intrinsically real. However, since past events are not intrinsi-
cally real, a memory that takes up those entities as its perceptual object also does not have
intrinsic nature. It is thus evident that memory is about “cessation.”
The meaning of the term “cessation” is not, however, different from “that which lacks intrinsic
reality”, “that which dependently originates” because “cessation” does not mean “nonexistence.”
It is not the case that all the past things are entirely nonexistent since they are objects of mem-
ory and that their effects are observable. But the ceased entities are not intrinsically real, for
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[intrinsic reality] would absurdly make them eternal, and they would absurdly be observable
presently.
Memory arises representing the type of object from which it arises, and memory also has the
same representation. Therefore, since memory is about recollecting a ceased entity, its objects
must be those that are ceased. It is like recalling when awake the objects experienced in a dream
[CST ̣XI.10, dBu ma Ya 182b].
Candrakırti explains the relationship between a ceased object and memory con-
sciousness with a dream analogy. Let us suppose that a person dreams of having sex
with a beautiful woman. When he wakes up from his sleep, he still remembers the
woman and his experience and becomes intensely obsessed. Even though there is a con-
siderable lapse of time (between the dream of having an intercourse with the woman
and the recalling of his experience while awake) and both the woman in the dream,
and the sensory experience, having long ceased, but still the ‘bygone objects’ and the
‘bygone experience’ causally trigger passionate memories to arise in the mind of the
person. In this way, the former experience of the objects through proprietary attention
that went out of existence is causally productive in triggering new memories. It works
just in the same way as the woman in the dream and the experience associated with it.
Although both have long ceased, they still causally produce passion in the mind of the
passionate. Candrakırti concisely puts the argument in this way:
Just as a na€ıve person may remember the objects apprehended during his dream and become
attached to them even though he is awake; even so, [memory cognition] as an effect may arise
out of the act [of proprietary attention towards the object] that has already ceased and that had
no intrinsic nature [Candrakırti, MA VI.40 Skt. ed. Xuezhu, Li.].
All mental events—for example, proprietary attention—are constituted by a series of
constantly disintegrating and arising phenomenological events, which upon their ceas-
ing leave impregnated impressions in the mind sustaining the phenomenological con-
tinuum of the aggregates. Consequently, when all the conditions appropriately gather,
despite the considerable lapse of time, previously ceased experience ripens in the form
of impregnated memory dispositions producing memory as its effect.
Stating the argument concisely:
1. Because proprietary attentive action does not arise intrinsically, it does not cease
intrinsically either.
2. Because it is possible for a future cognition to arise as an effect from a proprie-
tary attention which has not intrinsically ceased, memory cognition can depen-
dently arise from the cessation of proprietary attention.
3. The proprietary attentive action that has not intrinsically ceased thus indeed very
plausibly maintains its interdependent causal connection with a memory cogni-
tion as its effect [MABh VI.39 dBu ma ‘a: 260a].
6. Conclusion
Thus, it is clear, in comparison with Buddhaghosa, Candrakırti’s arguments have
greater purchase in deﬂating the self-implication requirement of episodic memory. As
a matter of fact, the key to the efﬁcacy of memory cognition is the causal efﬁcacy of
ontologically deﬂated subjects and the objects involved in the process of memory mak-
ing. Proprietary attention and the object towards which it is directed both cease
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dependently, but they do not cease intrinsically. Even so, episodic memory as an effect
arises dependently from them, but it is not produced intrinsically; thus completely
abandoning any reference to metaphysically thick notions of the Sautrantika-Yogaca-
ra’s reﬂexive awareness, Tulving’s self or the Mima _msaka-Naiyayika’s atman to
account for memory.
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